on, to "follow them to the
antipodes." "I am led to believe," he writes at another time, "that
the Ferrol squadron of French ships will push for the Mediterranean.
If it join that in Toulon, it will much outnumber us; but I shall
never lose sight of them, and Pellew (commanding the English squadron
off Ferrol) will soon be after them." So it happened often enough
during that prolonged war that divisions of French ships escaped,
through stress of weather, temporary absence of a blockading fleet, or
misjudgment on the part of its commander; but the alarm was quickly
given, some of the many frigates caught sight of them, followed to
detect their probable destination, passed the word from point to point
and from fleet to fleet, and soon a division of equal force was after
them, "to the antipodes" if need were. As, according to the
traditional use of the French navy by French governments, their
expeditions went not to fight the hostile fleet, but with "ulterior
objects," the angry buzz and hot pursuit that immediately followed was
far from conducive to an undisturbed and methodical execution of the
programme laid down, even by a single division; while to great
combinations, dependent upon uniting the divisions from different
ports, they were absolutely fatal. The adventurous cruise of Bruix,
leaving Brest with twenty-five ships-of-the-line in 1799, the rapidity
with which the news spread, the stirring action and individual
mistakes of the English, the frustration of the French projects[242]
and the closeness of the pursuit,[243] the escape of Missiessy from
Rochefort in 1805, of the divisions of Willaumez and Leissegues from
Brest in 1806,--all these may be named, along with the great Trafalgar
campaign, as affording interesting studies of a naval strategy
following the lines here suggested; while the campaign of 1798,
despite its brilliant ending at the Nile, may be cited as a case where
failure nearly ensued, owing to the English having no force before
Toulon when the expedition sailed, and to Nelson being insufficiently
provided with frigates. The nine weeks' cruise of Ganteaume in the
Mediterranean, in 1808, also illustrates the difficulty of controlling
a fleet which has been permitted to get out, unwatched by a strong
force, even in such narrow waters.

[Illustration: NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN.]

No parallel instances can be cited from the war of 1778, although the
old monarchy did not cover the movements of its fleets