resting on inadequate foundations, was ephemeral. During the
first three-quarters of the eighteenth century there was practically
no check to the sea power of England; great as were its effects upon
the issues of the day, the absence of a capable rival made its
operations barren of military lessons. In the later wars of the French
Republic and Empire, the apparent equality in numbers of ships and
weight of batteries was illusive, owing to the demoralization of the
French officers and seamen by causes upon which it is not necessary
here to enlarge. After some years of courageous but impotent effort,
the tremendous disaster of Trafalgar proclaimed to the world the
professional inefficiency of the French and Spanish navies, already
detected by the keen eyes of Nelson and his brother officers, and upon
which rested the contemptuous confidence that characterized his
attitude, and to some extent his tactics, toward them. Thenceforward
the emperor "turned his eyes from the only field of battle where
fortune had been unfaithful to him, and deciding to pursue England
elsewhere than upon the seas, undertook to restore his navy, but
without reserving to it any share in a strife become more than ever
furious.... Up to the last day of the Empire he refused to offer to
this restored navy, full of ardor and confidence, the opportunity to
measure itself with the enemy."[231] Great Britain resumed her old
position as unquestioned mistress of the seas.

The student of naval war will therefore expect to find a particular
interest in the plans and methods of the parties to this great
contest, and especially where they concern the general conduct of the
whole war, or of certain large and clearly defined portions of it; in
the strategic purpose which gave, or should have given, continuity to
their actions from first to last, and in the strategic movements which
affected for good or ill the fortunes of the more limited periods,
which may be called naval campaigns. For while it cannot be conceded
that the particular battles are, even at this day, wholly devoid of
tactical instruction, which it has been one of the aims of the
preceding pages to elicit, it is undoubtedly true that, like all the
tactical systems of history, they have had their day, and their
present usefulness to the student is rather in the mental training, in
the forming of correct tactical habits of thought, than in supplying
models for close imitation. On the other hand, the