re bound to take advantage of such a source of
weakness as the division of the enemy's force. Rodney in 1782 at Sta.
Lucia, watching the French contingent at Martinique to prevent its
union with the Spaniards at Cap Francais, is an instance of correct
strategic position; and had the islands been so placed as to put him
between the French and their destination, instead of in their rear,
nothing better could have been devised. As it was, he did the best
thing possible under the circumstances.

The defence, being the weaker, cannot attempt to block _all_ the ports
where divisions of the enemy lie, without defeating his aim by being
in inferior force before each. This would be to neglect the
fundamental principles of war. If he correctly decide not to do this,
but to collect a superior force before one or two points, it becomes
necessary to decide which shall be thus guarded and which
neglected,--a question involving the whole policy of the war after a
full understanding of the main conditions, military, moral, and
economic, in every quarter.

The defensive was necessarily accepted by England in 1778. It had been
a maxim with the best English naval authorities of the preceding era,
with Hawke and his contemporaries, that the British navy should be
kept equal in numbers to the combined fleets of the Bourbon
kingdoms,--a condition which, with the better quality of the
_personnel_ and the larger maritime population upon which it could
draw, would have given a real superiority of force. This precaution,
however, had not been observed during recent years. It is of no
consequence to this discussion whether the failure was due to the
inefficiency of the ministry, as was charged by their opponents, or to
the misplaced economy often practised by representative governments
in time of peace. The fact remains that, notwithstanding the notorious
probability of France and Spain joining in the war, the English navy
was inferior in number to that of the allies. In what have been called
the strategic features of the situation, the home bases, and the
secondary bases abroad, the advantage upon the whole lay with her. Her
positions, if not stronger in themselves, were at least better
situated, geographically, for strategic effect; but in the second
essential for war, the organized military force, or fleet, adequate to
offensive operations, she had been allowed to become inferior. It only
remained, therefore, to use this inferior force with