ommunications
between them, may be called the strategic features of the general
military situation, by which, and by the relative strength of the
opposing fleets, the nature of the operations must be determined. In
each of the three divisions of the field, Europe, America, and India,
under which for sake of clearness the narrative has been given, the
control of the sea has been insisted upon as the determining factor,
and the hostile fleet therefore indicated as the true objective. Let
the foregoing considerations now be applied to the whole field of
war, and see how far the same conclusion holds good of it, and if so,
what should have been the nature of the operations on either
side.[232]

In Europe the home base of Great Britain was on the English Channel,
with the two principal arsenals of Plymouth and Portsmouth. The base
of the allied powers was on the Atlantic, the principal military ports
being Brest, Ferrol, and Cadiz. Behind these, within the
Mediterranean, were the dock-yards of Toulon and Cartagena, over
against which stood the English station Port Mahon, in Minorca. The
latter, however, may be left wholly out of account, being confined to
a defensive part during the war, as the British fleet was not able to
spare any squadron to the Mediterranean. Gibraltar, on the contrary,
by its position, effectually watched over detachments or
reinforcements from within the Straits, provided it were utilized as
the station of a body of ships adequate to the duty. This was not
done; the British European fleet being kept tied to the Channel, that
is, to home defence, and making infrequent visits to the Rock to
convoy supplies essential to the endurance of the garrison. There was,
however, a difference in the parts played by Port Mahon and Gibraltar.
The former, being at the time wholly unimportant, received no
attention from the allies until late in the war, when it fell after a
six months' siege; whereas the latter, being considered of the first
importance, absorbed from the beginning a very large part of the
allied attack, and so made a valuable diversion in favor of Great
Britain. To this view of the principal features of the natural
strategic situation in Europe may properly be added the remark, that
such aid as Holland might be inclined to send to the allied fleets had
a very insecure line of communication, being forced to pass along the
English base on the Channel. Such aid in fact was never given.

In North Ameri