entirely upon control of the sea for them to be in themselves
proper objectives. The French government, therefore, forbade its naval
commanders to occupy such as they might seize. They were to make the
garrisons prisoners, destroy the defences, and so retire. In the
excellent military port of Fort Royal, Martinique, in Cap Francais,
and in the strong allied harbor of Havana, a fleet of adequate size
found good, secure, and well-distributed bases; while the early and
serious loss of Sta. Lucia must be attributed to the mismanagement of
the French fleet and the professional ability of the English admiral.
On shore, in the West Indies, the rival powers therefore found
themselves about equally provided with the necessary points of
support; mere occupation of others could not add to their military
strength, thenceforth dependent upon the numbers and quality of the
fleets. To extend occupation further with safety, the first need was
to obtain maritime supremacy, not only locally, but over the general
field of war. Otherwise occupation was precarious, unless enforced by
a body of troops so large as to entail expense beyond the worth of the
object. The key of the situation in the West Indies being thus in the
fleets, these became the true objectives of the military effort; and
all the more so because the real _military_ usefulness of the West
Indian ports in this war was as an intermediate base, between Europe
and the American continent, to which the fleets retired when the
armies went into winter quarters. No sound strategic operation on
shore was undertaken in the West Indies except the seizure of Sta.
Lucia by the English, and the abortive plan against Jamaica in 1782;
nor was any serious attempt against a military port, as Barbadoes or
Fort Royal, possible, until naval preponderance was assured either by
battle or by happy concentration of force. The key of the situation,
it must be repeated, was in the fleet.

The influence of naval power, of an armed fleet, upon the war on the
American continent has also been indicated in the opinions of
Washington and Sir Henry Clinton; while the situation in the East
Indies, regarded as a field by itself, has been so largely discussed
under the head of Suffren's campaign, that it needs here only to
repeat that everything there depended upon control of the sea by a
superior naval force. The capture of Trincomalee, essential as it was
to the French squadron which had no other base, was, l