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[197] In the council of war of the allied fleets on the expediency of attacking the English squadron anchored at Torbay (p. 408) an opponent of the measure urged "that the whole of the combined fleets could not bear down upon the English in a line-of-battle abreast, that of course they must form the line-of-battle ahead, and go down upon the enemy singly, by which they would run the greatest risk of being shattered and torn to pieces," etc. (Beatson, vol. v. p. 396). [198] In war, as in cards, the state of the score must at times dictate the play; and the chief who never takes into consideration the effect which his particular action will have on the general result, nor what is demanded of him by the condition of things elsewhere, both political and military, lacks an essential quality of a great general. "The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of Francisco [at Ciudad Rodrigo], and broke ground on the first night of the investment, the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the fire of the defence had in any way lessened, and before the counterscarp had been blown in, were the true causes of the sudden fall of the place. _Both the military and political state of affairs warranted this neglect of rules._ When the general terminated his order for the assault with this sentence, 'Ciudad Rodrigo _must_ be stormed this evening,' he knew well that it would be nobly understood" (Napier's Peninsular War). "Judging that the honour of his Majesty's arms, _and the circumstances of the war in these seas_, required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself justified in departing from the regular system" (Sir John Jervis's Report of the Battle of Cape St. Vincent). [199] By Kempenfeldt's attack upon De Guichen's convoy, and the following gale in December, 1781. See p. 408. [200] Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to Kerguelen, dated Paris. January 8, 1783. p. 263. [201] See pp. 366, 426. [202] See Map IV. of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532. [203] Weather quarter is behind, but on the windward side. [204] April 29, 1781, off Martinique, twenty-four ships to eighteen; January, 1782, thirty to twenty-two; April 9, 1782, thirty to twenty. [205] The difference of time from Trincomalee to the Saints is nine hours and a half. [206] The account of the transactions from April 9 to April 12 is based mainly upon the contemporary plates and descriptions o
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