ous act, it was unfortunate, and for Rodney's
credit should rather be attributed to the force of circumstances than
to choice. It had been better, these say, to have continued along
under the lee of the French rear, thus inflicting upon it the fire of
the whole English line, and that the latter should have tacked and
doubled on the French rear. This argument conveniently forgets that
tacking, or turning round in any way, after a brush of this kind, was
possible to only a part of the ships engaged; and that these would
have much difficulty in overtaking the enemies who had passed on,
unless the latter were very seriously crippled. Therefore this
suggested attack, the precise reproduction of the battle of Ushant,
really reduces itself to the fleets passing on opposite tacks, each
distributing its fire over the whole of the enemy's line without
attempting any concentration on a part of it. It may, and must, be
conceded at once, that Rodney's change of course permitted the eleven
rear ships of the French (D, r) to run off to leeward, having received
the fire of only part of their enemy, while the English van had
undergone that of nearly the whole French fleet. These ships, however,
were thus thrown entirely out of action for a measurable and important
time by being driven to leeward, and would have been still more out of
position to help any of their fleet, had not De Grasse himself been
sent to leeward by Hood's division cutting the line three ships ahead
of him. The thirteen leading French ships, obeying the last signal
they had seen, were hugging the wind; the group of six with De Grasse
(C, e) would have done the same had they not been headed off by Hood's
division. The result of Rodney's own action alone, therefore, would
have been to divide the French fleet into two parts, separated by a
space of six miles, and one of them hopelessly to leeward. The
English, having gained the wind, would have been in position easily to
"contain" the eleven lee ships, and to surround the nineteen weather
ones in overwhelming force. The actual condition, owing to the _two_
breaches in the line, was slightly different; the group of six with De
Grasse being placed between his weather and lee divisions, two miles
from the former, four from the latter (D). It seems scarcely necessary
to insist upon the tactical advantages of such a situation for the
English, even disregarding the moral effect of the confusion through
which the French had pas