endently of the tactical handling of the two fleets, there were
certain differences of equipment which conferred tactical advantage,
and are therefore worth noting. The French appear to have had finer
ships, and, class for class, heavier armaments. Sir Charles Douglas,
an eminent officer of active and ingenious turn of mind, who paid
particular attention to gunnery details, estimated that in weight of
battery the thirty-three French were superior to the thirty-six
English by the force of four 84-gun ships; and that after the loss of
the "Zele," "Jason," and "Caton" there still remained an advantage
equal to two seventy-fours. The French admiral La Graviere admits the
generally heavier calibre of French cannon at this era. The better
construction of the French ships and their greater draught caused them
to sail and beat better, and accounts in part for the success of De
Grasse in gaining to windward; for in the afternoon of the 11th only
three or four of the body of his fleet were visible _from the
mast-head_ of the English flag-ship, which had been within gunshot of
them on the 9th. It was the awkwardness of the unlucky "Zele" and of
the "Magnanime," which drew down De Grasse from his position of
vantage, and justified Rodney's perseverance in relying upon the
chapter of accidents to effect his purpose. The greater speed of the
French as a body is somewhat hard to account for, because, though
undoubtedly with far better lines, the practice of coppering the
bottom had not become so general in France as in England, and among
the French there were several uncoppered and worm-eaten ships.[213]
The better sailing of the French was, however, remarked by the English
officers, though the great gain mentioned must have been in part owing
to Rodney's lying-by, after the action of the 9th, to refit, due
probably to the greater injury received by the small body of his
vessels, which had been warmly engaged, with greatly superior numbers.
It was stated, in narrating that action, that the French kept at half
cannon-range; this was to neutralize a tactical advantage the English
had in the large number of carronades and other guns of light weight
but large calibre, which in close action told heavily, but were
useless at greater distances. The second in command, De Vaudreuil, to
whom was intrusted the conduct of that attack, expressly states that
if he had come within reach of the carronades his ships would have
been quickly unrigged. Wh