atever judgment is passed upon the military
policy of refusing to crush an enemy situated as the English division
was, there can be no question that, if the object was to prevent
pursuit, the tactics of De Vaudreuil on the 9th was in all respects
excellent. He inflicted the utmost injury with the least exposure of
his own force. On the 12th, De Grasse, by allowing himself to be lured
within reach of carronades, yielded this advantage, besides
sacrificing to an impulse his whole previous strategic policy. Rapidly
handled from their lightness, firing grape and shot of large
diameter, these guns were peculiarly harmful in close action and
useless at long range. In a later despatch De Vaudreuil says: "The
effect of these new arms is most deadly within musket range; it is
they which so badly crippled us on the 12th of April." There were
other gunnery innovations, in some at least of the English ships,
which by increasing the accuracy, the rapidity, and the field of fire,
greatly augmented the power of their batteries. These were the
introduction of locks, by which the man who aimed also fired; and the
fitting to the gun-carriages of breast-pieces and sweeps, so that the
guns could be pointed farther ahead or astern,--that is, over a larger
field than had been usual. In fights between single ships, not
controlled in their movements by their relations to a fleet, this
improvement would at times allow the possessor to take a position
whence he could train upon his enemy without the latter being able to
reply, and some striking instances of such tactical advantage are
given. In a fleet fight, such as is now being considered, the gain was
that the guns could be brought to bear farther forward, and could
follow the opponent longer as he passed astern, thus doubling, or
more, the number of shots he might receive, and lessening for him the
interval of immunity enjoyed between two successive antagonists.[214]
These matters of antiquated and now obsolete detail carry with them
lessons that are never obsolete; they differ in no respect from the
more modern experiences with the needle-gun and the torpedo.

And indeed this whole action of April 12, 1782, is fraught with sound
military teaching. Perseverance in pursuit, gaining advantage of
position, concentration of one's own effort, dispersal of the enemy's
force, the efficient tactical bearing of small but important
improvements in the material of war, have been dwelt on. To insist
fu