rther upon the necessity of not letting slip a chance to beat the
enemy in detail, would be thrown away on any one not already convinced
by the bearing of April 9 on April 12. The abandonment of the attack
upon Jamaica, after the defeat of the French fleet, shows
conclusively that the true way to secure ulterior objects is to defeat
the force which threatens them. There remains at least one criticism,
delicate in its character, but essential to draw out the full
teachings of these events; that is, upon the manner in which the
victory was followed up, and the consequent effects upon the war in
general.

The liability of sailing-ships to injury in spars and sails, in other
words, in that mobility which is the prime characteristic of naval
strength, makes it difficult to say, after a lapse of time, what might
or might not have been done. It is not only a question of actual
damage received, which log-books may record, but also of the means for
repair, the energy and aptitude of the officers and seamen, which
differ from ship to ship. As to the ability of the English fleet,
however, to follow up its advantages by a more vigorous pursuit on the
12th of April, we have the authority of two most distinguished
officers,--Sir Samuel Hood, the second in command, and Sir Charles
Douglas, the captain of the fleet, or chief-of-staff to the admiral.
The former expressed the opinion that twenty ships might have been
taken, and said so to Rodney the next day; while the chief-of-staff
was so much mortified by the failure, and by the manner in which the
admiral received his suggestions, as seriously to contemplate
resigning his position.[215]

Advice and criticism are easy, nor can the full weight of a
responsibility be felt, except by the man on whom it is laid; but
great results cannot often be reached in war without risk and effort.
The accuracy of the judgment of these two officers, however, is
confirmed by inference from the French reports. Rodney justifies his
failure to pursue by alleging the crippled condition of many ships,
and other matters incident to the conclusion of a hard-fought battle,
and then goes on to suggest what might have been done that night, had
he pursued, by the French fleet, which "went off in a body of
twenty-six ships-of-the-line."[216] These possibilities are rather
creditable to his imagination, considering what the French fleet had
done by day; but as regards the body of twenty-six[217] ships, De
Vaudreu