hile the English would surely be
reinforced? And if the English position was as strong as good
judgment, professional skill, and bold hearts could make it, had it
not weak points? Were not the lee ships to leeward? If they did
attempt to beat to windward, had he not ships to "contain" them? If
the van ship could not be reached, had he not force enough to double
and treble on the third and following ships, as far down the line as
he chose? A letter of Suffren's, referring to a similar condition of
things at Santa Lucia,[201] but written three years before these
events, seems almost a prophetic description of them:--

"Notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of
December 15 [1778], we can yet expect success; but the only way
to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in
consequence of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their
land works, which will become of no effect _if we lay them on
board, or anchor upon their buoys_. If we delay, a thousand
circumstances may save them. _They may profit by the night to
depart._"

There can be no doubt that the English would have sold their defeat
dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the
long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a few simple principles--that
the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign,
that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must
be crushed without delay when caught thus separated--would have saved
De Grasse a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would
have made him an exception to the practice of the French navy.

The hour was now close at hand when the French admiral should feel,
even if he did not admit, the consequences of this mistake, by which he
had won a paltry island and lost an English fleet. Rodney had sailed
from Europe on the 15th of January, with twelve ships-of-the-line. On
the 19th of February he anchored at Barbadoes, and the same day Hood
reached Antigua from St. Kitt's. On the 25th the squadrons of Rodney
and Hood met to windward of Antigua, forming a united fleet of
thirty-four ships-of-the-line. The next day De Grasse anchored in Fort
Royal, thus escaping the pursuit which Rodney at once began. The
English admiral then returned to Sta. Lucia, where he was joined by
three more ships-of-the-line from England, raising his force to
thirty-seven. Knowing that a large convoy was expected from Franc