English rear was still
becalmed. The greater numbers of the French enabled them to extend
from north to south along the length of the English line, whereas the
latter was still broken by a great gap between the van and centre
(Position II.). The attack upon Hood was therefore hotly renewed;
but the French centre and rear (b), having the wind, kept their
distance, and held Rodney's division at long range. At quarter-past
one the French, finding that the whole British line was coming up with
the wind, ceased firing, and at two Rodney hauled down the signal for
battle, the enemy having withdrawn.

[Illustration: Pl. XX. RODNEY & DE GRASSE. APRIL 9, 1782.]

This action of the 9th of April amounted actually to no more than an
artillery duel. One French ship, the "Caton," a sixty-four (d),
received injuries which sent her into Guadeloupe; two English were
disabled, but repaired their injuries without leaving the fleet. The
material advantage, therefore, lay with the latter. Opinions differ as
to the generalship of the Comte de Grasse on this day, but they divide
on the same basis of principle as to whether ulterior operations, or
the chances of beating the enemy's fleet, are to determine an
admiral's action. The facts of the case are these: Sixteen of the
English fleet, all the rear and four of the centre (Position II., c),
were not able at any time to fire a shot. Apparently every French
ship, first and last, might have been brought into action. At the
beginning, eight or nine English were opposed to fifteen French. At
the end there were twenty English to thirty-three French, and these
general proportions doubtless obtained throughout the four hours. De
Grasse therefore found himself in the presence of a fleet superior to
his own, in numbers at least, and by the favor of Providence that
fleet so divided that nearly half of it was powerless to act. He had
the wind, he had a fine body of captains; what was to prevent him from
attacking Hood's nine ships with fifteen, putting one on each side of
the six in the rear. Had those nine been thoroughly beaten, Rodney's
further movements must have been hopelessly crippled. The French lost
only five in their defeat three days later. The subsequent
court-martial, however, laid down the French doctrine thus: "The
decision to persist in engaging with only a part of our fleet may be
considered as an act of prudence on the part of the admiral, which
might be dictated by the ulterior p