n, for offensive purposes, his
commanding position. So long as De Grasse kept to windward, he
maintained his communications with Martinique, and he was strong
enough, too, to force communication when necessary with the troops
before Brimstone Hill. It was probable, as the event showed, that the
particular operation, the reduction of St. Kitt's, would succeed
despite the presence of the English fleet; and "the French navy has
always preferred the glory of assuring a conquest to that, more
brilliant perhaps but less real, of taking a few ships."

So far De Grasse may be acquitted of any error beyond that of not
rising above the traditions of his service. Some days, however, before
the surrender of the island and the departure of the English fleet, he
was joined by two ships-of-the-line which brought him word of the
dispersal of the expected convoy and reinforcements from Europe.[199]
He then knew that he himself could not be strengthened before Rodney's
arrival, and that by that event the English would be superior to him.
He had actually thirty-three ships-of-the-line in hand, and a few
miles off lay twenty-two English in a position where he knew they
would await his attack; yet he let them escape. His own explanation
implies clearly that he had no intention of attacking them at
anchor:--

"The day after the capitulation of Brimstone Hill was the moment
to watch Hood closely, and to fight him _as soon as he got under
way_ from the conquered island. But our provisions were
exhausted; We had only enough for thirty-six hours. Some
supply-ships had arrived at Nevis, and you will admit one must
live before fighting. I went to Nevis, always to windward and in
sight of the enemy, a league and a half from him, in order to
take on board the necessary supplies as rapidly as possible.
Hood decamped at night without signals, and the next morning I
found only the sick whom he left behind."[200]

In other words, Hood having held his ground with consummate audacity
and skill, when he had some chance of successful resistance, declined
to await his adversary's attack under conditions overwhelmingly
unfavorable. What shall be said of this talk about provisions? Did not
the Comte de Grasse know a month before how long, to a day, the
supplies on board would last? Did he not know, four days before Hood
sailed, that he had with him every ship he could probably count on for
the approaching campaign, w