e. On the 13th De Grasse took his fleet, now
amounting to thirty-three ships-of-the-line, to Nevis, and anchored
there. On the night of the 14th Hood summoned all his captains on
board, had them set their watches by his, and at eleven P.M., one
after another, without noise or signal, cut their cables and made sail
to the northward, passing round that end of the island unnoticed, or
at least unmolested, by the French.

Both strategically and tactically Hood's conceptions and dispositions
were excellent, and their execution was most honorable to the skill
and steadiness of himself and his captains. Regarded as a single
military operation, this was brilliant throughout; but when considered
with reference to the general situation of England at the time, a much
higher estimate must be formed of the admiral's qualities.[198] St.
Kitt's in itself might not be worth a great risk; but it was of the
first importance that energy and audacity should be carried into the
conduct of England's naval war, that some great success should light
upon her flag. Material success was not obtained. The chances, though
fair enough, turned against Hood; but every man in that fleet must
have felt the glow of daring achievement, the assured confidence which
follows a great deed nobly done. Had this man been in chief command
when greater issues were at stake, had he been first instead of second
at the Chesapeake, Cornwallis might have been saved. The
operation--seizing an anchorage left by the enemy--would have been
nearly the same; and both situations may be instructively compared
with Suffren's relief of Cuddalore.

The action of De Grasse, also, should be considered not only with
reference to the particular occasion, but to the general condition of
the war as well, and when thus weighed, and further compared with
other very similar opportunities neglected by this general officer, a
fair estimate of his military capacity can be reached. This
comparison, however, is better deferred to the now not very distant
close of the campaign. The most useful comment to be made here is,
that his action in failing to crush Hood at his anchors, with a force
at least fifty per cent greater, was in strict accordance with the
general French principle of subordinating the action of the fleet to
so-called particular operations; for nothing is more instructive than
to note how an unsound principle results in disastrous action. Hood's
inferiority was such as to weake