us, and under fire a perilous process. A
further most important point to note is that all the eastern ships
were so placed that vessels approaching from the southward could
reach them with the usual wind.

Hood, therefore, we are told, intended to appear at early daylight, in
order of and ready for battle, and fall upon the eastern ships, filing
by them with his whole fleet (a, a'), thus concentrating the fire of
all upon a few of the enemy; then turning away, so as to escape the
guns of the others, he proposed, first wearing and then tacking, to
keep his fleet circling in long procession (a', a'') past that part of
the enemy's ships chosen for attack. The plan was audacious, but
undeniably sound in principle; some good could hardly fail to follow,
and unless De Grasse showed more readiness than he had hitherto done,
even decisive results might be hoped for.[194]

[Illustration: Pl. XVIII. HOOD & DE GRASSE. JAN. 25 & 26, 1782.]

The best-laid plans, however, may fail, and Hood's was balked by the
awkwardness of a lieutenant of the watch, who hove-to (stopped) a
frigate at night ahead of the fleet, and was consequently run down by
a ship-of-the-line. The latter also received such injury as delayed
the movement, several hours being lost in repairing damages. The
French were thus warned of the enemy's approach, and although not
suspecting his intention to attack, De Grasse feared that Hood would
pass down to leeward of him and disturb the siege of Brimstone
Hill,--an undertaking so rash for an inferior force that it is as
difficult to conceive how he could have supposed it, as to account for
his overlooking the weakness of his own position at anchor.

At one P.M. of the 24th the English fleet was seen rounding the south
end of Nevis; at three De Grasse got under way and stood to the
southward. Toward sundown Hood also went about and stood south, as
though retreating; but he was well to windward of his opponent, and
maintained this advantage through the night. At daybreak both fleets
were to leeward of Nevis,--the English near the island, the French
about nine miles distant (Plate XIX.). Some time was spent in
manoeuvring, with the object on Hood's part of getting the French
admiral yet more to leeward; for, having failed in his first attempt,
he had formed the yet bolder intention of seizing the anchorage his
unskilful opponent had left, and establishing himself there in an
impregnable manner. In this he succeeded,