s things such
as syllogisms, propositions and the like, wherein the process follows
certain and fixed rules, consequently in respect of such things it is
possible to have the essentials of art, but not of prudence; and so
we find such a thing as a speculative art, but not a speculative
prudence.
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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 3]
Whether Prudence Takes Cognizance of Singulars?
Objection 1: It would seem that prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars. For prudence is in the reason, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).
But "reason deals with universals," according to _Phys._ i, 5.
Therefore prudence does not take cognizance except of universals.
Obj. 2: Further, singulars are infinite in number. But the reason
cannot comprehend an infinite number of things. Therefore prudence
which is right reason, is not about singulars.
Obj. 3: Further, particulars are known by the senses. But prudence is
not in a sense, for many persons who have keen outward senses are
devoid of prudence. Therefore prudence does not take cognizance of
singulars.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 7) that "prudence
does not deal with universals only, but needs to take cognizance of
singulars also."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1, ad 3), to prudence belongs
not only the consideration of the reason, but also the application to
action, which is the end of the practical reason. But no man can
conveniently apply one thing to another, unless he knows both the
thing to be applied, and the thing to which it has to be applied. Now
actions are in singular matters: and so it is necessary for the
prudent man to know both the universal principles of reason, and the
singulars about which actions are concerned.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason first and chiefly is concerned with universals,
and yet it is able to apply universal rules to particular cases:
hence the conclusions of syllogisms are not only universal, but also
particular, because the intellect by a kind of reflection extends to
matter, as stated in _De Anima_ iii.
Reply Obj. 2: It is because the infinite number of singulars cannot
be comprehended by human reason, that "our counsels are uncertain"
(Wis. 9:14). Nevertheless experience reduces the infinity of
singulars to a certain finite number which occur as a general rule,
and the knowledge of these suffices for human prudence.
Reply Obj. 3: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 8), prudence does
no
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