eculative, as in the case of the liberal arts. Therefore
prudence also is both practical and speculative.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that prudence
is right reason applied to action. Now this belongs to none but the
practical reason. Therefore prudence is in the practical reason only.

_I answer that,_ According to the Philosopher (Ethic. vi, 5) "a
prudent man is one who is capable of taking good counsel." Now
counsel is about things that we have to do in relation to some end:
and the reason that deals with things to be done for an end is the
practical reason. Hence it is evident that prudence resides only in
the practical reason.

Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (Q. 45, AA. 1, 3), wisdom considers the
absolutely highest cause: so that the consideration of the highest
cause in any particular genus belongs to wisdom in that genus. Now in
the genus of human acts the highest cause is the common end of all
human life, and it is this end that prudence intends. For the
Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 5) that just as he who reasons well for
the realization of a particular end, such as victory, is said to be
prudent, not absolutely, but in a particular genus, namely warfare,
so he that reasons well with regard to right conduct as a whole, is
said to be prudent absolutely. Wherefore it is clear that prudence is
wisdom about human affairs: but not wisdom absolutely, because it is
not about the absolutely highest cause, for it is about human good,
and this is not the best thing of all. And so it is stated
significantly that "prudence is wisdom for man," but not wisdom
absolutely.

Reply Obj. 2: Ambrose, and Tully also (De Invent. ii, 53) take the
word prudence in a broad sense for any human knowledge, whether
speculative or practical. And yet it may also be replied that the act
itself of the speculative reason, in so far as it is voluntary, is a
matter of choice and counsel as to its exercise; and consequently
comes under the direction of prudence. On the other hand, as regards
its specification in relation to its object which is the "necessary
true," it comes under neither counsel nor prudence.

Reply Obj. 3: Every application of right reason in the work of
production belongs to art: but to prudence belongs only the
application of right reason in matters of counsel, which are those
wherein there is no fixed way of obtaining the end, as stated in
_Ethic._ iii, 3. Since then, the speculative reason make