e a fool to bonds."

_I answer that,_ As already stated (A. 2), folly, in so far as it is
a sin, is caused by the spiritual sense being dulled, so as to be
incapable of judging spiritual things. Now man's sense is plunged
into earthly things chiefly by lust, which is about the greatest of
pleasures; and these absorb the mind more than any others. Therefore
the folly which is a sin, arises chiefly from lust.

Reply Obj. 1: It is part of folly that a man should have a distaste
for God and His gifts. Hence Gregory mentions two daughters of lust,
pertaining to folly, namely, "hatred of God" and "despair of the life
to come"; thus he divides folly into two parts as it were.

Reply Obj. 2: These words of the Apostle are to be understood, not
causally but essentially, because, to wit, worldly wisdom itself is
folly with God. Hence it does not follow that whatever belongs to
worldly wisdom, is a cause of this folly.

Reply Obj. 3: Anger by reason of its keenness, as stated above
(I-II, Q. 48, AA. 2, 3, 4), produces a great change in the nature
of the body, wherefore it conduces very much to the folly which
results from a bodily impediment. On the other hand the folly which is
caused by a spiritual impediment, viz. by the mind being plunged into
earthly things, arises chiefly from lust, as stated above.
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TREATISE ON THE CARDINAL VIRTUES (QQ. 47-170)
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QUESTION 47

OF PRUDENCE, CONSIDERED IN ITSELF
(In Sixteen Articles)

After treating of the theological virtues, we must in due sequence
consider the cardinal virtues. In the first place we shall consider
prudence in itself; secondly, its parts; thirdly, the corresponding
gift; fourthly, the contrary vices; fifthly, the precepts concerning
prudence.

Under the first head there are sixteen points of inquiry:

(1) Whether prudence is in the will or in the reason?

(2) If in the reason, whether it is only in the practical, or also
in the speculative reason?

(3) Whether it takes cognizance of singulars?

(4) Whether it is virtue?

(5) Whether it is a special virtue?

(6) Whether it appoints the end to the moral virtues?

(7) Whether it fixes the mean in the moral virtues?

(8) Whether its proper act is command?

(9) Whether solicitude or watchfulness belongs to prudence?

(10) Whether prudence extends to the governing of many?

(11) Whether the prudence which regards private good is the same
in species as that