ain, "At this rate, events would
come forth uncaused from the womb of non-entity, to which omnipotence did
not give birth, and which omniscience could not foresee."(86) Now all this
is spoken, be it remembered, in relation to the volitions or acts of men.
But if there are no such events, except such as omnipotence gives birth
to, or summons into being, how clear and how irresistible is the
conclusion that God is the author of the sinful acts of the creature? It
were better, we say, ten thousand times better, that sin, _that_ monstrous
birth of night and darkness, should grow up out of the womb of nonentity,
if such were the only alternative, than that it should proceed from the
bosom of God.

Chapter III.

Scheme Of Necessity Denies The Reality Of Moral Distinctions.

Our voluntary service He requires,
Not our necessitated; such with him
Finds no acceptance, nor can find; for how
Can hearts, not free, be tried whether they serve
Willing or no, who will but what they must
By destiny, and can no other choose?--MILTON.

In the preceding chapters we have taken it for granted that there is such
a thing as moral good and evil, and endeavoured to show, that if the
scheme of necessity be true, man is absolved from guilt, and God is the
author of sin. But, in point of fact, if the scheme of necessity be true,
there is no such thing as moral good or evil in this lower world; all
distinction between virtue and vice, moral good and evil, is a mere dream,
and we really live in a non-moral world. This has been shown by many of
the advocates of necessity.

Section I.

The views of Spinoza in relation to the reality of moral distinctions.

It is shown by Spinoza, that all moral distinctions vanish before the iron
scheme of necessity. They are swept away as the dreams of vulgar prejudice
by the force of Spinoza's logic; yet little praise is due, we think, on
that account, to the superiority of his acumen. The wonder is, not that
Spinoza should have drawn such an inference, but that any one should fail
to draw it. For if our volitions are necessitated by causes over which we
have no control, it seems to follow, as clear as noonday, that they cannot
be the objects of praise or blame--cannot be our virtue or vice. So far is
it indeed from requiring any logical acuteness to perceive such an
inference, that it demands, as we sha