oment it is not in the power of the intellect
to pass any other judgment than that it passes. It obeys laws it did not
make. It yields to motives which determine it independent of the will. In
a word, the phenomenon of intelligence, comprehending, judging, knowing,
thinking, whatever name be given to it, is marked with the characteristic
of necessity."(101)

Once more I fix my attention on the apple: an agreeable sensation arises
in the mind; a desire to eat it is awakened. This desire or appetite is a
state of the sensibility. Whether I shall feel this appetite or desire,
does not depend upon any effort or exertion of my will. The mind is
clearly passive in relation to it; the desire, then, is as strongly marked
with the characteristic of necessity, as are the states of the
intelligence. The same is true of all our feelings; they are necessarily
determined by the objects in view of the mind. There is no controversy on
these points; it is universally agreed that every state of the
intelligence and of the sensibility is necessarily determined by the
evidence and the object in view of the mind. It is not, then, either in
the intelligence or in the sensibility that we are to look for liberty.

But once more I fix my attention on the apple: the desire is awakened, and
I conclude to eat it. Hitherto I have done nothing except in fixing my
attention on the apple. I have experienced the judgment that it is round,
and felt the desire to eat it. But now I conclude to eat it, and I make an
effort of the mind to put forth my hand to take the apple and eat it. It
is done. Now here is an entirely new phenomenon; it is an _effort_, an
_exertion_, an _act_, a _volition_ of the mind. The name is of no
importance; the circumstances under which the phenomenon arises have
called attention to it, and the precise thing intended is seen in the
light of consciousness. Let us look at it closely, and mark its
characteristic well, being careful to see neither more nor less than is
presented by the phenomenon itself.

We are conscious, then, of the existence of an act, of a volition:
everybody can see what this is. We must not say, as the advocates of
free-agency usually do, that when we put forth this act or volition we are
conscious of a power to do the contrary; for this position may be refuted,
and the foundation on which we intend to raise our superstructure
undermined. We are merely conscious of the existence of the act itself,
and not ev