cumstances, then, as I
observed before, _it is a thing possible and supposable that the cause may
sometimes exert the same influence under the same circumstances, and yet
the effect not follow_."(119) He has much other similar reasoning to show
that it is absurd and contradictory to say that motive is the cause of
volition, and yet admit that volition may be loose from the influence of
motive, or that "the cause is not sufficient to produce the effect."(120)
In all this he uses the term in its most narrow and restricted sense. It
is no longer a mere antecedent or antecedents, which are sufficient to
account for the existence of the phenomena of volition; it is an efficient
cause which produces volitions. Thus he establishes his ambiguous
proposition in one sense, and builds on it in another. He explains the
term _cause_ to signify any antecedent, in order, he tells us, to prevent
objection to his doctrine, when he alleges that nothing ever comes to pass
without some cause of its existence; and yet, when he applies this
fundamental proposition to the construction of his scheme, he returns to
the restricted sense of the word, in which it signifies, "that which has a
positive efficacy or influence to produce a thing." It is thus that the
great scheme of President Edwards is made up of mere words, having no
intrinsic coherency of parts, and appearing consistent throughout, only
because its disjointed fragments seem to be united, and its huge chasms
concealed by means of the ambiguities of language.

Section III.

The scheme of necessity is supported by false logic.

One reason why the advocates of necessity deceive themselves, as well as
others, is, that there is great want of precision and distinctness in
their views and definitions. We are told by them that the will is always
determined by the strongest motive; that this is invariably the cause of
volition. But what is meant by the term _cause_? We have final causes,
instrumental causes, occasional causes, predisposing causes, efficient
causes, and many others. Now, in which of these senses is the word used,
when we are informed that motive is the cause of volition? On this point
we are not enlightened. Neither Leibnitz nor Edwards is sufficiently
explicit. The proposition, as left by them, is vague and obscure.

Leibnitz inclined to the use of the word _reason_, because he carried on a
controversy with Bayle and Hobbes, who were a