nd produce its volitions. But this
seems to be a very great mistake, which has arisen from viewing the subtle
operations of the mind through the medium of those mechanical forms of
thought that have been derived from the contemplation of the phenomena of
the material world. In truth, the feelings do not act at all, and
consequently they cannot act upon the will. It is absurd, as Locke and
Edwards well say, to ascribe power, which belongs to the agent himself, to
the properties of an agent. Hence, it is absurd to suppose that our
feelings, appetites, desires, and passions, are endowed with power, and
can act. They are not agents--they are merely the properties of an agent.
It is the mind itself which acts, and not its passions. These are but
passive impressions made upon the sensibility; and hence, "it is to
philosophize very crudely concerning mind, and to image everything in a
corporeal manner," to conceive that they act upon the will and control its
determinations, just as the motions of body are caused and controlled by
the action of mind.(127)

This conception, however, is not peculiar to the necessitarian. It has
been most unfortunately sanctioned by the greatest advocates of
free-agency. Thus says Dr. Reid, in relation to the appetites and
passions: "Such motives are not addressed to the rational powers. Their
influence is _immediately_ upon the will." "When a man is acted upon by
contrary motives of this kind, he finds it easy to yield to the strongest.
_They are like two forces pushing him in contrary directions. To yield to
the strongest he needs only be passive._" If this be so, how can Dr. Reid
maintain, as he does, that "the determination was made by the _man_, and
not by the motive?" To this assertion Sir William Hamilton replies: "But
was the _man_ determined by no motive to that determination? Was his
specific volition to this or to that without a cause? On the supposition
that the sum of the influences (motives, dispositions, tendencies) to
volition A is equal to 12, and the sum of counter volition B, equal to
8--can we conceive that the determination of volition A should not be
necessary? We can only conceive the volition B to be determined by
supposing that the man _creates_ (calls from nonexistence into existence)
a certain supplement of influences. But this creation as actual, or in
itself, is inconceivable; and even to conceive the possibility of this
inconceivable act, we must suppose some cause by