which the man is
determined to exert it. We thus _in thought_, never escape determination
and necessity. It will be observed that I do not consider this inability
to notion any disproof of the fact of free-will."
It is true, that if we suppose, according to the doctrine of Sir William
and Dr. Reid, that two counter influences act upon the will, the one being
as 12 and the other as 8, then the first must necessarily prevail. But if
this supposition be correct, we are not only unable to conceive the fact
of liberty, we are also able to conceive that it cannot be a fact at all.
There is a great difference, we have been accustomed to believe, between
being unable to conceive how a thing is, and being able to conceive that
it cannot be anyhow at all: the first would leave it a mere mystery,--the
last would show it to be an absurdity. In the one case, the thing would be
above reason, and in the other, contrary to reason. Now, to which of these
categories does the fact of liberty, as left by Sir William Hamilton,
belong? Is it a mystery, or is it an absurdity? Is it an inconceivable
fact, or is it a conceived impossibility? It seems to us that it is the
latter; and that if we will only take the pains to view the phenomena of
mind as they exist in consciousness, and not through the medium of
material analogies, we shall be able to untie the knot which Sir William
Hamilton has found it necessary to cut.
The doctrine of liberty, if properly viewed, is perfectly conceivable. We
can certainly conceive that the omnipotence of God can put forth an act
without being impelled thereto by a power back of his own; and to suppose
otherwise, is to suppose a power greater than God's, and upon which the
exercise of his omnipotence depends. By parity of reason, we should be
compelled to suppose another power still back of that, and so on _ad
infinitum_. This is not only absurd, but, as Calvin truly says, it is
impious. Here, then, we have upon the throne of the universe a clear and
unequivocal instance of a self-active power,--a power whose goings forth
are not impelled by any power without itself. It goes forth, it is true,
in the light of the Eternal Reason, and in pursuit of the ends of the
Eternal Goodness; but yet in itself it possesses an infinite fulness,
being self-sustained, self-active, and wholly independent of all other
powers and influences whatsoever.
Now, if such a Being should create at all, it is not difficult to conceive
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