that he would create subordinate agents, bearing his own image in this,
namely, the possession of a self-active power. It is not difficult to
conceive that he should produce spiritual beings like himself, who can act
without being necessitated to act, like the inanimate portions of
creation, as well as those of an inferior nature. Nor is it more difficult
to conceive that man, in point of fact, possesses such a limited
self-active power, than it is to conceive that God possesses an infinite
self-active power. Indeed we must and do conceive this, or else we should
have no type or representative in this lower part of the world, by and
through which to rise to a contemplation of its universal Lord and
Sovereign. We should have a temple without a symbol, and a universe
without a God. But God has not thus left himself without witness; for he
has raised man above the dust of the earth in this, that he is endowed
with a self-active power, from whence, as from an humble platform, he may
rise to the sublime contemplation of the Universal Mover of the heavens
and the earth. But for this ray of light, shed abroad in our hearts by the
creative energy of God, the nature of the divine power itself would be
unknown to us, and its eternal, immutable glories shrouded in impenetrable
darkness. The idea of an omnipotent power, moving in and of itself in
obedience to the dictates of infinite wisdom and goodness, would be
forever merged and lost in the dark scheme of an implexed series and
concatenation of causes, binding all things fast, God himself not
excepted, in the iron bonds of fate.

If liberty be a _fact_, as Sir William Hamilton contends it is, then no
such objections can be urged against it as those in which he supposes it
to be involved. We are aware of what may be said in favour of such a mode
of viewing subjects of this kind, as well as of the nature of the
principles from which it takes its rise. But we cannot consider those
principles altogether sound. They appear to be too sceptical, with respect
to the powers of the human mind, and the destiny of human knowledge. The
sentiment of Leibnitz seems to rest upon a more solid foundation. "It is
necessary to come," says he, "to the grand question which M. Bayle has
recently brought upon the carpet, to wit, whether a truth, and especially
a truth of faith, can be subject to unanswerable objections. That
excellent author seems boldly to maintain the affirmative of this
question: he