ry to the perfection of the universe, or
is an unavoidable part of the best world that could have been created. It
is thus that he neutralizes, without demolishing, the argument of the
atheist, and each person is left to be more deeply affected by the
argument of Leibnitz, or by that of Bayle, as his faith in the unlimited
goodness of God is strong or weak. If the theist, by such means, should
gain a complete victory, this would be due to the faith of the vanquished,
rather than to the superiority of the logic by which he is subdued.
To this argument of Leibnitz we may then well apply his own remarks upon
another celebrated philosopher. Descartes met the argument of the
necessitarian, not by exposing its fallacy, but by repelling the
conclusion of it on extraneous grounds. "This was to cut the Gordian
knot," says Leibnitz, who was himself a necessitarian, "and to reply to
the conclusion of one argument, not by resolving it, but by opposing to it
a contrary argument; which is not conformed to the laws of philosophical
controversy." The reply of Leibnitz to Bayle is clearly open to the same
objection. It does not analyze the sophism of the sceptic, or resolve it
into its elements, and point out its error; it merely opposes its
conclusion by the presentation of a contrary argument. Hence it is not
likely to produce very great effect; for, as Leibnitz himself says, in
relation to this mode of attacking sceptics, "It may arrest them a little,
but they will always return to their reasoning, presented in different
forms, until we cause them to comprehend wherein the defect of their
sophism consists." Leibnitz has, then, according to his own canons of
criticism, merely cut the Gordian knot of atheism, which he should have
unravelled. He has merely arrested the champions of scepticism "a little,"
whom he should have overthrown and demolished.
His reply is not only incomplete, in that it does not expose the sophistry
of the atheist; it is also unsound. It carries in its bosom the elements
of its own destruction. It is self-contradictory, and consequently
untenable. It admits that it is easy for God to cause virtue to exist, and
yet contends that, in certain cases, he fails to do so, because the
highest good of the universe requires the existence of moral evil. But how
is this possible? It will be conceded that the good of the individual
would be promoted, if God should cause him to be perfectly holy and happy.
This would be for
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