from being sensible that we place a "stoical fate" above God, or
any other kind of fate. We would not place mathematics above God; much
less would we place him below mathematics. Nor would we say anything which
would seem to render him otherwise than "perfectly free in his purpose, or
in his providence." To say that he cannot make two and two equal to five,
is not, we trust, inconsistent with the perfection of his freedom. If it
would be a great imperfection in mortals, as all orthodox divines will
admit, to be able to affirm and believe that two and two are equal to
five; then it would be a still greater imperfection in God, not only to be
able to affirm such a thing, but to embody it in an actual creation. In
like manner, if it would be an imperfection in us to be able to affirm so
great "an absurdity," a thing so "inconceivable" as a "necessary
volition;" then it could not add much to the glory of the Divine Being, to
suppose him capable of producing such a monstrosity in the constitution
and government of the world.

There is a class of theologians who reject every explication of the origin
of evil, on the ground that they limit the divine sovereignty; and to the
question why evil is permitted to exist, they reply, "We cannot tell." If
God can, as they insist he can, easily cause holiness to shine forth with
unclouded, universal splendour, no wonder they cannot tell why he does not
do so. If, by a single glance of his eye, he can make hell itself clear up
and shine out into a heaven, and fix the eternal glories of the moral
universe upon an immovable foundation, no wonder they can see no reason
why he refuses to do so. The only wonder is that they cannot see that, on
this principle, there is no reason at all for such refusal, and the
permission of moral evil. For if God can do all this, and yet permits sin
"to raise its hideous head in his dominions," then there is, and must be,
something which he loves more than holiness, or abhors more than sin. And
hence, the reason why they cannot tell is, in our humble opinion, because
they have already _told too much_,--more than they know. To doubt in the
right place, is often the best cure for doubt; and to dogmatize in the
wrong place, is often the most certain road to scepticism.

Section III.

The foregoing scheme, it may be said, presents a gloomy view of the
universe.

If we say that God cannot necessitate our volitions, or neces