ish, be seen, and then may we entirely dispel the
cloud which has so long seemed to hang over the wisdom and sincerity of
the Supreme Ruler of the world. We might offer strictures upon other
passages of the solution under consideration; but as the same error runs
through all of them, the reader may easily unravel its remaining
obscurities and embarrassments for himself.
If holiness cannot be caused by a _direct_ application of power, it
follows that there is no want of wisdom in the use of _indirect_ means, or
of sincerity in the use of the most efficacious means the nature of the
case will admit: but if universal holiness may be caused to exist by a
mere word, then indeed it seems to be clearly inconsistent with wisdom to
resort to means which must fail to secure it, and with sincerity to utter
the most solemn and vehement asseverations that it is the will of God to
secure it; for how obvious is the inquiry, If he so earnestly desire it,
and can so easily secure it, why does he not do it?
In rejecting the principle for which we contend, Howe has paid the usual
penalty of denying the truth; that is, he has contradicted himself. "It
were very unreasonable to imagine," says he, "that God cannot, in any
case, extraordinarily oversway the inclinations and determine the will of
such a creature, in a way agreeable enough to its nature, (though we
particularly know not, and we are not concerned to know, or curiously to
inquire in what way,) and highly reasonable to suppose that in many cases
he doth." Here he affirms, that our wills may be overruled and determined
in perfect _conformity to our natures_, in some way or other, though we
know not how. Why, then, does not God so overrule our wills in all cases,
and secure the existence of universal holiness? Because, says he, "it is
manifest to any sober reason, that it were very incongruous this should be
the ordinary course of his conduct to mankind, or the same persons at all
times; that is, that the whole order of intelligent creatures should be
moved only by inward impulses; _that God's precepts, promises, and
comminations, whereof their nature is capable, should be all made
impertinences_, through his constant overpowering those that should
neglect them; that the faculties, whereby men are capable of moral
government, should be rendered to this purpose, _useless and vain_; and
that they should be tempted to expect to be constantly managed _as mere
machines that know not th
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