limpse. So far from beholding the love
of God, which shines forth so conspicuously in the cross of Christ, they
see in it only an act of injustice and cruelty on the part of God.

One source of this error, we have no doubt, is to be found in the use, or
rather in the abuse, of the term _punishment_. In the strict sense of the
word, it is not only unjust, but impossible, for God to punish the
innocent. The very idea of punishment, according to the strict sense of
the word, implies the notion of guilt or ill-desert in the person upon
whom it is inflicted. It is suffering inflicted on an offender, on account
of his real or supposed personal guilt. Hence, as God regards all things
just as they are in themselves, he cannot possibly look upon the innocent
as guilty; and consequently he cannot, in the strict sense of the word,
inflict punishment upon them. And when we speak of the punishment of
Christ, we merely mean, or should merely mean, to convey the idea that he
_suffered_, in order to release us from the _punishment_ due to our sins.
It would be well, perhaps, if this could always be borne in mind; for most
men are more under the influence and power of words than they are apt to
see, or willing to acknowledge. The mere expression, the _punishment_ of
the innocent, is apt to awaken associations in the mind which are
inconsistent with the dictates of justice; but which the idea of the
atonement would never have suggested, if clearly and distinctly viewed in
its own clear light, and not through the dark medium of an ill-defined
phraseology.

Another source of the error in question is to be found in the ambiguity of
the term justice. It is frequently said that the atonement is a
satisfaction to divine justice; to which it is replied, that justice
requires the punishment of the very individual who offends, and not of
another person in his place. Let us consider this subject.

The term _justice_ has two distinct significations, which I shall
designate by the epithets _retributive_ and _administrative_. By
retributive justice, I mean that attribute which inclines Him to punish an
offender merely on account of the intrinsic demerit and hatefulness of his
offence; and which animadverts upon the evil conduct of a moral agent,
considered as an individual, and not as a member of the great family of
intelligent beings. This attribute seeks to punish sin merely because it
deserves punishment, and not because its punishment is necessa