ed, that a necessitated virtue is a contradiction in
terms, and that it is indispensably requisite to ordain rewards and
punishments in order to prevent sin and secure holiness; it may still be
said that the penalty of eternal death is too severe for that purpose, and
is therefore inconsistent with the goodness of God. Indeed, after such a
concession, this is the only position which can be taken in opposition to
the doctrine in question. Let us then look at it, and examine the
assumption upon which it rests for support.
If such punishments be too severe, it must be for one of these two
reasons: either because no object can justify the infliction of them, or
because the end proposed by the Supreme Ruler is not sufficiently great
for that purpose.
Let us suppose, then, in the first place, the position to be assumed, that
no object can possibly justify the infliction of such awful punishments.
Such would be the case, we admit, if such punishments were unjust--were not
deserved by the person upon whom they are inflicted. Hence, it becomes
indispensable, in order to vindicate the divine benevolence, to show that
eternal sufferings are deserved by those upon whom they fall. Otherwise
they would be unjust, and consequently unjustifiable; as the end could
never justify the means.
We say, then, that eternal sufferings are deserved by the finally
impenitent, not because every sinful act carries along with it an infinite
guilt, nor because every sinner may be imagined to have committed an
infinite number of sins, but because they will continue to sin forever. It
will be conceded, that if punishment be admissible at all, it is right and
proper that so long as acts of rebellion are persisted in, the rewards of
iniquity should attend them. It will be conceded, that if the finally
impenitent should continue to sin forever, then they forever deserve to
reap the rewards of sin. But this is one part of the Scripture doctrine of
future punishments, that those who endure them will never cease to sin and
rebel against the authority of God's law.
Foster has attempted a reply to this defence of the doctrine in question,
but without success. "It is usually alleged," says he, "that there will be
an endless _continuance_ of sinning ... and therefore the punishment must
be endless." But "the allegation," he replies, "is of no avail in
vindication of the doctrine, because the first consignment to this
dreadful state _necessitates a continua
|