; it is simply to drop the weapons
of our warfare, and oppose the shield of faith to the shafts of the
adversary.
It is also contended by Leibnitz and King, as well as many other good
authors, that there is an established order, or system of laws, in the
government of the world; into which so great a confusion would be
introduced by the interposition of divine power to prevent all sin, that
some had better be permitted. This, which Leibnitz so positively asserts,
is thrown out as a conjecture by Bishop Butler.(225) But in the present
controversy, it is not to the point. For here the question is concerning
the order and government of the moral world itself. And this being the
question, it is not admissible for one of the parties to say, that the
proposed plan for the government of the world is not the best, because it
would interfere with and disturb the arrangements of that which is
established. This is clearly to beg the question. It is to assume that the
established method is the best, and therefore should not have been
superseded by another; but this is the very point in dispute.
The truth is, that the theist has assailed the sceptic in his strong and
impregnable point, and left the vulnerable part of his system untouched.
This may be easily seen. The objection of the sceptic is thus stated by
Leibnitz: Whoever can prevent the sin of another, and does not, but rather
contributes to it by his concourse and by the occasions he gives rise to,
though he possesses a perfect knowledge, is an accomplice. God can prevent
the sin of his intelligent creatures: but he does it not, though his
knowledge be perfect, and contributes to it by his concourse and the
occasions to which he gives rise: therefore he is an accomplice. Now
Leibnitz admits the minor, and denies the major, premiss of this argument.
He should have done the contrary. For, admitting that God might easily
prevent sin, and cause holiness to reign universally, what had he left to
oppose to the attacks of the sceptic but the shield of faith? He might
say, indeed, as he often does, that God voluntarily permits sin, because
it is a part and parcel of the best possible universe. But how easy for
the sceptic to demand, What good purpose does it answer? Can it add to the
holiness or happiness of the universe? Cannot these high ends, these
glorious purposes of the Divine Being, be as well attained by the
universal rectitude and purity of his creatures, as by any other m
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