c
and overpowering lustre of its evidence, stand some chance to disarm the
enemies of God, that they have not even found one in which they themselves
can rest. The school of the necessitarian is, in reality, a house divided
against itself; and that, too, in regard to the most vital and fundamental
point of its philosophy.

There seems to be one exception to the truth of this general remark: for
there is one scheme or definition of liberty, in which many, if not most,
of the advocates of necessity have concurred; that is, the definition of
Hobbes. As the current of a river, says he, is free to flow down its
channel, provided there be no obstruction in the way; so the human will,
though compelled to act by causes over which it has no control, is free,
provided there be no external impediment to prevent its volition from
passing into effect. This idea of the freedom of the will, though much
older than Hobbes, is primarily indebted to his influence for its
prevalence in modern times; for it descended from Hobbes to Locke, from
Locke to Edwards, and from Edwards to the modern school of Calvinistic
divines.

No matter how we come by our volitions, says Edwards, yet are we perfectly
free when there is no external impediment to hinder our volitions from
passing into effect: that is to say, though our volitions be absolutely
produced by the divine omnipotence itself, or in any other way; yet is the
will free, provided no external cause interpose to prevent its volition
from moving the body. According to this definition of the liberty of the
will, it is not a _property_ of the soul at all, but only an _accidental_
circumstance or condition of the body. In the significant language of
Leibnitz, it is not the freedom of the mind; it is merely "elbow-room." It
consists not in an attribute, or property, or power of the soul, but only
in the external opportunity which its necessitated volitions may have to
necessitate an effect. We ask, How can the mind be free? and they tell us,
When the body may be so! We inquire about an _attribute_ of the spiritual
principle within, and they turn us off with an answer respecting an
_accident_ of the material principle without! An _ignoratio elenchi_ more
flagrant--a mistaking of the question more palpable--it is surely not
possible to conceive. Yet this definition of the freedom of the will,
though so superficially false, is precisely that which has found the most
general acceptance among necessit