e by their volition. True, we may
judge of _external_ actions according as their origin is in the will or
otherwise, without considering how its volitions come to pass; but then
this is because we proceed on the tacit assumption that the will is free,
and not under the dominion of necessitating causes. But the question
relates, not to external actions or movements of the body, but to the
volitions of the mind itself. And this being the case, it does make a vast
difference in our estimate, whether we consider those volitions as coming
to pass freely; or whether, according to the scheme of necessity, we
regard them as being produced by the operation of causes over which we
have no control. In this case, it is impossible for the human mind to
attach praise or blame to them, or view them as constituting either virtue
or vice. For nothing can be plainer than the position, that if anything in
us be produced by the mighty and irresistible operation of an extraneous
agency, it can neither be our virtue nor vice. This principle is so clear,
that logic can neither add to nor detract from the intrinsic lustre of its
evidence. And all the cloudy sophistications of an Edwards, ingenious as
they are, can obscure it only to the minds of those who have not
sufficient penetration to see through the nature of his arguments.

At this point, then, as well as at others, the scheme of necessity,
instead of clearing up the old, has introduced new difficulties into the
system of the world. Instead of diffusing light, it has actually extended
the empire of darkness, by investing in the clouds and mists of its own
raising, some of the brightest elements which enter into its organization.
By scholastic refinements and sophistical devices, it has sought to
overturn and destroy, not the elements of error and confusion, but some of
the clearest and most indestructible intuitional convictions of the human
head and heart.

But great as these difficulties are, we may still be asked to embrace the
scheme from which they flow, on the ground that it is true. Indeed, this
is the course pursued by some of the most enlightened Calvinistic
necessitarians of the present day. Freely admitting that all the attempts
of Leibnitz, of Edwards, and others, to bring the scheme of necessity into
an agreement with the dictates of reason, have left its stupendous
difficulties pretty much where they found them--wrapped in impenetrable
gloom; they nevertheless maintain thi