ound
a subject; much better adapted to work upon the feelings than to enlighten
the judgment. All that he seems to have seen in the case, is a poor, weak
creature, utterly unable to do any good, subjected to eternal torments for
the sins of "a few fleeting years on earth." Hence it was, that "the moral
argument," which "pressed so irresistibly on his mind," came in "the
stupendous idea of eternity."

Indeed, according to his theology, there could be no object sufficiently
vast, no necessity sufficiently imperious, to justify eternal punishments.
The prevention of sin, and the promotion of universal holiness, could not
form such an object or constitute such a necessity; for, according to his
creed, all this might have been most perfectly attained by a word. Hence,
he was puzzled and confounded in the contemplation of what appeared to him
so much unnecessary evil. "I acknowledge my _inability_," said he, "to
admit the belief, (the belief in endless punishment,) together with the
belief in the divine goodness--the belief that 'God is love,' that 'his
tender mercies are over all his works.' "

As we have already seen from another point of view, we must come out from
his theology if we would see the harmony and agreement between these
beliefs. We must take our stand on the position, that Omnipotence cannot
necessitate holiness, and must have recourse to rewards and punishments to
secure it. Otherwise all evil and all suffering will remain an
inexplicable enigma; all rewards and punishments awkward and clumsy
contrivances to attain an end, which might be much better attained without
them.

On this high and impregnable ground the moral argument of Foster loses all
its irresistible force, and "the stupendous idea of eternity" presses with
all its weight in favour of endless punishment. If temporal punishments
are justified on the ground that they are necessary to meet the exigencies
and uphold the interests of temporal governments, surely eternal
punishments may be justified on the same ground in relation to an eternal
government. The "stupendous idea of eternity" attaches to the whole, as
well as to the part; and hence nothing can be gained to the cause of
Universalism by the introduction of this idea, except in the minds of
those who take only a one-sided and partial view of the subject.

The spectacle of punishment for a single day, it will be admitted, would
be justified on the ground that it was necessary to support for