human virtue, adopts as its distinguishing tenet this position, that
that grace is denied to many."(215) Notwithstanding his most elaborate
defence of predestination, he may well say, that "a cloud still hangs over
the subject," and darkens the mercy of God.
Some of the stereotyped attempts of Calvinists to escape from the cloud
which hangs over their doctrine are too weak to deserve a serious
refutation. We are often asked, for example, if God may not do what he
pleases with his own? Most assuredly he may; but does it please him,
according to the high supralapsarian notion of Calvin, to create myriads
of men and angels, to the end that they may be eternally damned? Does it
please him, according even to the sublapsarian scheme, to leave the great
mass of mankind in the helpless and forlorn condition in which they were
born, without assistance, and then subject them to eternal misery, because
they would not render an obedience beyond their power? Truly, the
sovereign Creator and Ruler of the world may do what he pleases with his
own; but yet we insist, that it is his supremest pleasure to deal with his
creatures according to the eternal principles of justice and mercy.
His power is infinite, we admit, nay, we joyfully believe; but yet it is
not a power which works according to the lawless pleasure of an
unmitigated despot. It moves within a sphere of light and love. God's
infinite wisdom and goodness superintend and surround all its workings;
otherwise its omnipotent actings would soon carry the goodly frame of the
world, together with all the blessed inhabitants thereof, into a state of
utter confusion and chaotic night; leaving occasion for none, save the
blind idolaters of power, to exclaim, "May he not do what he pleases with
his own?"
We are also told, that "God is under no obligation to his creatures."
Supposing this to be true, (though true most certainly it is not,) yet
does he not owe it to himself--does he not owe it to the eternal principles
of truth and goodness--does he not owe it to the glory of his own empire
over the world--to deal with his rational and immortal creatures, otherwise
than according to the dark scheme of Calvinistic predestination? Nay, is
it not due to the creature himself, that he should have some little chance
or opportunity to embrace the life which God has set before him? Or, in
default of such opportunity, is it not due to him that he should be exempt
from the wages of the second
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