y not;
and whether it be a blessing or a curse depends, not upon the beneficence
of the giver, but upon the disposition and character of the recipient.
Before we should presume to indulge the least complaint, then, against the
goodness of divine providence, we should be able to produce the nation,
whose character for moral goodness and virtue would, on the whole, and in
relation to its circumstances, have been improved by the interposition of
God in causing the light of truth to shine in the midst of its
corruptions. But we are manifestly incompetent to deal with a question of
such a nature. Its infinite complication, as well as its stupendous
magnitude, places it entirely beyond the reach of the human mind. So
manifold and so multiform are the hidden causes upon which its solution
depends, that general principles cannot be brought to bear upon it; and
its infinite variety and complication of detail must forever baffle the
intellect of man. Hence, an objection which proceeds on the supposition
that this question has been solved and determined, is worth nothing.
But, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that the unequal diffusion
of religious knowledge has proceeded directly from the agency of God.
Still the objection against his goodness, in regard to the dispensation of
light, would be no greater than in relation to all the dispensations of
his favour. All the gifts of Heaven--health, riches, honour, intelligence,
and whatever else comes down from above--are scattered among the children
of men with the most promiscuous variety. Hence, the unequal distribution
of the blessings of the gospel, or rather of its external advantages, is
so far from being inconsistent with the character of God, that it is of a
piece with all his other dispensations: it is so far from standing out as
an anomaly in the proceedings of the Divine Being, that it falls in with
the whole analogy of nature and of providence. Hence, there is no
resting-place between the abandonment of this objection, and downright
atheism.
Let us see, then, what force there is in this objection, when urged, as it
is by the atheist, against the whole constitution and management of the
world. It proceeds on the supposition, that if light and knowledge, or any
other natural advantage, were bestowed upon one person, it would be
bestowed upon all others, and upon all in precisely the same degree.
According to his view, there should be no such thing as degrees in
kno
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