unsearchable
counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he
pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass
by, and to ordain to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of
his glorious justice."

The defenders of this system assume the position, that as "by Adam's sin
the whole human race became a corrupt mass, and justly subject to eternal
damnation; so that no one can blame God's righteous decision, if none are
saved from perdition."(210) Augustine expressly says: "But why faith is
not given to all, need not move the faithful, who believe that by one all
came into condemnation, doubtless the most just; _so that there would be
no just complaining of God, though no one should be freed_." And again:
"The dominion of death has so far prevailed over men, that the deserved
punishment would drive all headlong into a second death likewise, of which
there is no end, if the undeserved grace of God did not deliver them from
it."(211) Such is the picture of the divine justice, which the advocates
of predestination have presented, from the time of Augustine, the great
founder of the doctrine, down to the present day. It surely furnishes a
sufficiently dark background on which to display the divine mercy to
advantage.

We are told, however, that we should not judge of the proceeding of God,
according to our notions of justice. This is certainly true, if the divine
justice is fairly represented in the scheme of predestination; for that is
clearly unlike all that is called justice among men. If God can create
countless myriads of beings, who, because they come into the world with a
depraved nature, and "can do nothing but sin," he regards with such
displeasure, as to leave them without hope and without remedy; and not
only so, but dooms them to eternal misery on account of an unavoidable
continuance in sin; it must be confessed, that we should not presume to
apply our notions of justice to his dealings with the world. They would
more exactly accord with our notions of injustice, cruelty, and
oppression, than with any others of which we are capable of forming any
conception.

But, if we are not to decide according to our notions of justice, how
shall we judge, or form any opinion respecting the equity of the divine
proceeding? Shall we judge according to some notion which we do not
possess, or shall we not judge at all? This last would seem to be the
wiser course; but i