eater or more desirable degree? Who can say that there
would have been more holiness and happiness, with less sin and misery, in
the universe, if the punishment of those whom nothing could reclaim had
not been eternal? Who can say that it would be better for the universe, on
the whole, if the punishment of sin were limited than if it were eternal?
Until this question, which so evidently lies beyond the range of our
narrow faculties, be answered, it is presumption to object that eternal
punishment is inconsistent with the goodness of God. For aught the
objector knows, this very penalty is demanded by infinite goodness itself,
in order to stay the universal ravages of sin, and preserve the glory of
the moral empire of Jehovah. For aught he knows, the very sufferings of
the lost forever may be, not only a manifestation of the justice of God,
but also a profound expression of that tender mercy which is over all his
works. For aught he knows, this very appointment, at which he takes so
great offence, may be one of the main pillars in the structure of the
intellectual system of the universe; without which its internal
constitution would be radically defective, and its moral government
impossible. In short, for aught he knows, his objection may arise, not
from any undue or unnecessary severity of the punishment in question, but
from his own utter incapacity to decide such a point in relation to the
universal and eternal government of God.
It may be said that this is an appeal to human ignorance, rather than a
reply to the argument of the Universalist. Surely, it is good to be
reminded of our ignorance, when we undertake to base objections against
the doctrines of religion upon assumptions about the truth of which we
know, and, from the nature of the case, must know, absolutely nothing. If
the doctrine in question involved any inherent contradictions, or were it
clearly at war with the dictates of justice, or mercy, or truth, there
might be some reason in our opposition; but to oppose it because we cannot
see how it subserves the highest interests of the universe, seems to be an
exceedingly rash and hasty decision; especially as we see that such a
penalty must powerfully tend to restrain the wickedness of men, as well as
to preserve unfallen creatures in their obedience.
It is not at all strange that beings with such faculties as we possess,
limited on all sides, and far more influenced by feeling than by reason,
should be op
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