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et the will,--the good will,--in order to render him acceptable to God? Does he get it from nature--is it a part of his birth-right? No: from this he derives a depraved will, "free to evil only." Is it vouchsafed to him from above? Is it a gift from God? Alas! to those who are lost, and perish eternally in their sins, the grace of God is never given! What does it signify thus to tell them, or to tell the world, that they have the natural ability to obey; that none of their natural faculties are lost; that they still have understandings, and affections, and wills? What can all these avail them? Is it not the merest mockery to assure them that they really have hearts, and wills, and feelings, if they "_must_ go wrong," if they _must_ put forth the volitions for which they shall be tormented forever? Upon this distinction we shall not dwell, as we have fully considered it in our "Examination of Edwards on the Will." We shall merely add, that it is not an invention of modern times.(200) It is at least as old as the age of Augustine. "The Pelagians think," says he, "they know some great thing, when they say, '_God would not command what he knew could not be done by man_.' Who does not know this? But he commands what we cannot do, whereby we know what we ought to ask of him. For it is faith which obtains by prayer what the law commands. For true it is that we keep the commandments _if we will_, (_si volumus_;) but as the will is prepared of the Lord, we must seek of him that we may will as much as is sufficient, in order to our doing by volition, (_ut volendo faciamus_.)" Truly, we can keep the commandments _if we will_ to do so; for, as Augustine immediately says, "certain it is, that we will when we will."(201) But no man can put forth a volition in conformity with the commandments, unless it be given him of God, who "causes us to will good;"(202) and this is never given to the reprobate. How, then, can they be justly consigned to eternal torments? How can they be eternally punished for that which they could not possibly avoid? It is no wonder that a Foster should have shrunk from "the infinite horrors of such a tenet," as seen from this point of view; the only wonder is, that any one can be found who can possibly endure them. The same distinction, as we have already said, is relied upon by Edwards in order to show that man has an ability to obey the law of God.(203) Thus we are gravely taught that we are able to obey th
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