e world.

Section I.

The false grounds upon which the doctrine of the eternity of future
punishment has been placed.

Nothing could be more untenable, it seems to us, than the usual argument
in favour of future punishments, which seeks to justify their eternity on
the ground that every sinful act, because it is committed against an
infinite being, is infinite, and therefore deserves to be visited with
endless torments. This argument, which seems but little better than a play
on the term _infinite_, is perhaps calculated to make no impression upon
any mind, which is not already fully persuaded of the truth of the
doctrine in question. On the other hand, it may be so easily refuted by a
multitude of considerations, that it exposes the doctrine, in one of its
defences, to the triumphant attacks of its adversaries. We shall not
exhaust the patience of the reader by dwelling upon the refutation which
may be given of such an argument. We shall dismiss it with a single reply,
and that we shall give in the language of John Foster.

"A common argument has been that sin is an _infinite evil_, that is, of
infinite demerit, as an offence against an infinite being; and that, since
a finite creature cannot suffer infinitely _in measure_, he must _in
duration_. But, surely in all reason, the limited, and in the present
instance, _diminutive nature of the criminal_, must be an essential part
of the case for judgment. Every act must, for one of its proportions, be
measured by the nature and condition of the agent: and it would seem that
one principle in that rule of proportion should be, that the offending
agent should be capable of being aware of the magnitude (the _amount_, if
we might use such a word,) of the offence he commits, by being capable of
something like an adequate conception of the being against whom it is
committed. A perverse child, committing an offence against a great
monarch, of whose dignity it _had some_, but a vastly inadequate
apprehension, would not be punished in the same manner as an offender of
high endowments and responsibility, and fully aware of the dignity of the
personage offended. The one would justly be sharply chastised; the other
might as justly be condemned to death. In the present case, the offender
does or may know that the Being offended against is of awful majesty, and
therefore the offence is one of great aggravation, and he will justly be
punished wit