and
therefore should be laid aside by all who aspire to such a character.

Section II.

It may be imagined that the views herein set forth limit the omnipotence
of God.

This objection has already been sufficiently answered; but it may be well
to notice it more distinctly and by itself, as it is one upon which great
reliance will be placed. It is not denying the omnipotence of God, as all
agree, to say that he cannot work contradictions; but, as we have seen, a
necessitated volition is a contradiction in terms. Hence, it does not deny
or limit the divine omnipotence, to say, it cannot produce or necessitate
our volitions. It is absurd to say, that that is a voluntary exercise of
power, which is produced in us by the power of God. Both of these
principles are conceded by those who will be among the foremost, in all
probability, to deny the conclusion which necessarily flows from them.
Thus, the Princeton Review, for example, admits that God cannot work
contradictions; and also that "a necessary volition is an absurdity, a
thing inconceivable." But will it say, that God cannot work a volition in
the human mind? that omnipotence cannot work this particular absurdity? If
that journal should speak on this subject at all, we venture to predict it
will be seen that it has enounced a great truth, without perceiving its
bearing upon the Princeton school of theology.

If this objection has any solidity, it lies with equal force against the
scheme of Leibnitz, Edwards, and other philosophers and divines, as well
as against the doctrine of the foregoing treatise. For they affirm, that
God chooses sin as the necessary means of the greatest good; and that he
could not exclude sin from the universe, without causing a greater evil
than its permission. This sentiment is repeatedly set forth in the Essais
de Theodicee of Leibnitz; and it is also repeatedly avowed by Edwards.
Now, here is an inherent impossibility; namely, the prevention of sin
without producing a greater evil than its permission, which it is assumed
God cannot work. In other words, when it is asserted, that he chooses sin
as the necessary means of the greatest good, it is clearly intended that
he _cannot_ secure the greatest good without choosing that sin should
exist. Hence if the doctrine of this discourse limits the omnipotence of
God, no less can be said of that to which it is opposed.

But both schemes may be objected to on