be pledged to prevent its existence, it
is clear that it cannot be regarded as a limitation of the divine power.
This cuts off the objection of Voltaire, and explodes the grand sophism on
which it is based. God hates sin above all things, and is more than
willing to prevent it; and he actually does so, in so far as this is
possible to infinite wisdom and power. This refutes the objection of
Bayle, and leaves his argument without the shadow of a foundation. God
does not choose sin, or permit it as a means of the highest good, as if
there could be any higher good than absolute and universal holiness; but
it comes to pass, because God has created a world of moral agents, and
they have transgressed his law. This removes the high and holy God
infinitely above the contamination of all evil, above all contact with the
sin of the world, and shows an impassable gulf between the purity of the
Creator and the pravity of the creature. By revealing the true connexion
of sin with the moral universe, and its relation to God, it clearly shows
that its existence should not raise the slightest cloud of suspicion
respecting his infinite goodness and power, and thus reconciles the fact
of sin's existence with the adorable perfections of the Governor of the
world.

It may be said, that although God could not cause holiness to prevail
universally, by the exercise of his power, yet he might employ means and
influences sufficient to prevent the occurrence of sin. To this there are
two satisfactory answers. First, it is a contradiction to admit that God
cannot necessitate virtue, because such a thing is impossible; and yet
suppose that he could, in all cases, secure the existence of it, without
any chance of failure. It both asserts and denies at the same time, the
idea of a necessary holiness. Secondly, the objection in question proceeds
on the supposition, that there are resources in the stores of infinite
wisdom and goodness, which might have been successfully employed for the
good of the universe, and which God has failed to employ. But this is a
mere gratuitous assumption. It never has been, and it never can be proved.
It has not even the appearance of reason in its favour. Let the objector
show wherein the Almighty could have done more than he has actually done
to prevent sin, and secure holiness, without attempting violence to the
nature of man, and then his objection may have some force, and be entitled
to some consideration. But if he c