the good of each and every individual moral agent in the
universe. How, then, is it possible for such an exercise of the divine
power to be for the good of all the parts, and yet not for the good of the
whole? So far from being able to see how these things can hang together,
it seems evident that they are utterly repugnant to each other.

The highest good of the universe, we are told, requires the permission of
evil. What good? Is it the holiness of moral agents? This, it is said, can
be produced by the agency of God, without the introduction of evil, and
produced, too, in the greatest conceivable degree of perfection. Why
should evil be permitted, then, in order to attain an end, which it is
conceded can be perfectly attained without it? Is there any higher end
than the perfect moral purity of the universe, which God seeks to
accomplish by the permission of sin? It certainly is not the happiness of
the moral universe; for this can also be secured, in the highest possible
degree, by the agency of the Divine Being, without the permission of moral
evil. What good is there, then, beside the perfect holiness and happiness
of the universe, to the production of which the existence of moral evil is
necessary? There seems to be no such good in reality. It appears to be a
dream of the imagination, a splendid fiction, which has been recommended
to the human mind by its horror of the cheerless gloom of scepticism.

Section V.

The sophism of the atheist exploded, and a perfect agreement shown to
subsist between the existence of sin and the holiness of God.

Supposing God to possess perfect holiness, he would certainly prevent all
moral evil, says the atheist, unless his power were limited. This
inference is drawn from a false premiss; namely, that if God is
omnipotent, he could easily prevent moral evil, and cause virtue to exist
without any mixture of vice. This assumption has been incautiously
conceded to the atheist by his opponent, and hence his argument has not
been clearly and fully refuted. To refute this argument with perfect
clearness, it is necessary to show two things: first, that it is no
limitation of the divine omnipotence to say that it cannot work
contradictions; and secondly, that if God should cause virtue to exist in
the heart of a moral agent, he would work a contradiction. We shall
endeavour to evince these two things, in order to refute the grand sophism
of the scept