ld not have been the case if evil could have been
ascribed to the Supreme God as its author. If those philosophers could
have regarded him as a Being of partial goodness, they would have found no
difficulty in explaining the origin and existence of evil; they would
simply have attributed the good and the evil in the world to the good and
the evil supposed to pertain to his nature. But they could not do this,
inasmuch as the human mind no sooner forms an idea of God, than it regards
him as a being of unlimited and unmixed goodness. It has shown a
disposition, in all ages, to adopt the most wild and untenable hypotheses,
rather than entertain the imagination that evil could proceed from the
Father of Lights. The doctrine of Manes, then, as well as the other
hypotheses employed to explain the origin of evil, demonstrates how deep
is the conviction of the human mind that God is light, and in him there is
no darkness at all. In searching after the fountain of evil, it turns from
the great source of life and light, and embraces the wildest
extravagancies, rather than indulge a dark suspicion respecting the
goodness of its Maker.

Section III.

The hypothesis of optimism.

"The fundamental principle of the optimist is," says Dugald Stewart, "that
all events are ordered for the best; and that evils which we suffer are
parts of a great system conducted by almighty power under the direction of
infinite wisdom and goodness." Leibnitz, who is unquestionably one of the
greatest philosophers the world has produced, has exerted all his powers
to adorn and recommend the scheme of optimism. We have, in a former
chapter, considered the system of Leibnitz; but we have not denied its
fundamental principle, which is so well expressed in the above language of
Mr. Stewart. If he had confined himself to that principle, without
undertaking to explain _how_ it is that God orders all things for the
best, his doctrine would have been free from objections, except for a want
of clearness and precision.

Dr. Chalmers has said that the scheme of optimism, as left by Leibnitz, is
merely an hypothesis. He insists, however, that even as an hypothesis, it
may be made to serve a highly important purpose in theology. "If it be not
an offensive weapon," says he, "with which we may beat down and demolish
the strongholds of the sceptic, it is, at least, an armour of defence,
with which we may cause all his shafts to fa