cites grave theologians on his side, and even those of Rome,
who appear to say what he pretends; and he adduces philosophers who have
believed _that there are even philosophical truths, the defenders of which
cannot reply to objections made against them_." "For my part," says
Leibnitz, "I avow that I cannot be of the sentiment of those who maintain
that a truth can be liable to invincible objections; for what is an
_objection_ but an argument of which the conclusion contradicts our
thesis? and is not an invincible argument a demonstration?" "It is always
necessary to yield to demonstrations, whether they are proposed for our
adoption, or advanced in the form of objections. And it is unjust and
useless to wish to weaken the proofs of adversaries, under the pretext
that they are only objections; since the adversary has the same right, and
can reverse the denominations, by honouring his arguments with the name of
_proofs_, and lowering yours by the disparaging name of objections."(128)
There is another false conception, by which the necessitarian fortifies
himself in his opposition to the freedom of the will. As he identifies the
sensibility and the will, so when the indifference of the latter is spoken
of, the language is understood to mean that the mind is indifferent, and
destitute of all feeling or emotion. But this is to view the doctrine of
liberty, not as it is held by its advocates, but as it is seen through the
medium of a false psychology. We might adduce a hundred examples of the
truth of this remark, but one or two must suffice. Thus, Collins supposes
that the doctrine of liberty implies, that the mind is "indifferent to
good and evil;" "indifferent to what causes _pleasure_ or _pain_;"
"indifferent to all objects, and swayed by no motives." Gross as this
misrepresentation of the doctrine of free-agency is, it is frequently made
by its opponents. It occurs repeatedly in the writings of President
Edwards and President Day.(129) The freedom of the _will_, indeed, no more
implies an indifference of the _sensibility_ than the power of a bird to
fly implies the existence of a vacuum.
Section V.
The scheme of necessity is recommended by false analogies.
It is insisted that there is no difficulty in conceiving of a caused
action or volition; but this position is illustrated by false and
deceptive analogies. Thus says an advocate of necessity: "The term passive
is sometime
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