more agreeable manner than the other, and therefore the intelligence
pronounces that one is more to be desired than the other. This seems to be
precisely what is meant by the use of the term preference. One prefers an
orange to an apple, for instance, because the orange affects his
sensibility more agreeably than the apple; and the intelligence perceiving
this state of the sensibility, declares in favour of the orange. This
decision of the judgment is what is usually meant by the use of the term
preference, or choice. To prefer, is merely to judge, in view of desire,
which of two objects is more agreeable. But judging and desiring are, as
we have seen, both necessitated states of the mind. Why, then, apply the
term preference, or choice, to acts of the will? Why apply a term, which
seems to express merely a state of the intelligence, which all concede is
necessitated, to an act of the will? Is it not evident, that by such a use
of language the cause of necessity gains great apparent strength?
There is another way in which the language of the necessitarian deceives.
The language he employs often represents the facts of nature, but not
facts as they would be, if his system were true. Hence, when this system
is attacked, its advocates repel the attack by the use of words which
truly represent nature, but not their errors. This gives great
plausibility to their apologies. Thus, when it is objected that the scheme
of necessity "makes men no more than mere machines," they are always ready
to reply, "that notwithstanding this doctrine, man is entirely, perfectly,
and unspeakably different from a machine." But how? Is it because his
volitions, as they are called, are not necessarily determined by causes?
No. Is it because his will may be loose from the influence of motives? No.
Is it because he may follow the strongest motive, or may not follow it?
No. Nothing of the kind is hinted. How does the man, then, differ so
entirely from a machine? Why, "in that he has reason and understanding,
with a faculty of will, and so is capable of volition and choice." True, a
machine has no reason or understanding; but suppose it had, would it be a
person? By no means. We have seen that the understanding, or the
intelligence, is necessarily determined; all its states are necessitated
as completely as the movements of a machine. This constitutes an essential
likeness, and it is what is always meant, when it is said that necessity
makes men mere
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