ssitarian.
But in truth the freedom of the mind does not consist in its possessing a
power over the determinations of its own will, for the true notion of
freedom is a negative idea, and consists in the absence of every power
over the determinations of the will. The mind is free because it possesses
a power of acting, over which there is no controlling power, either within
or without itself.
It must be admitted, it seems to us, that the advocates of free-agency
have too often sanctioned this false conception of liberty, and thereby
strengthened the cause of their opponents. Cudworth, Clark, Stuart,
Coleridge, and Reid, all speak of this supposed power of the mind over the
determinations of the will, as that which constitutes its freedom. Thus
says Reid, for example: "By the liberty of a moral agent, I understand a
power over the determinations of his own will." Now, it is not at all
strange that this language should be conceived by necessitarians in such a
manner as to involve the doctrine of liberty in the absurd consequence of
an infinite series of acts, since it is so understood by some of the most
enlightened advocates of free-agency themselves. "A power over the
determinations of our will," says Sir William Hamilton, "supposes an act
of the will that our will should determine so and so; for we can only
exert power through a rational determination or volition. _This definition
of liberty is right._ But the question upon question remains, (and this
_ad infinitum_)--have we a power (a will) over such anterior will? and
until this question be definitively answered, which it never can, we must
be _unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of liberty_. But,
though inconceivable, this fact is not therefore false." True, we are
unable to conceive the possibility of the fact of liberty, if this must be
conceived as consisting in a power over the determinations of the will;
but, in our humble opinion, this definition of liberty is not right. It
seems more correct to say, that the freedom of the will consists in the
absence of a power over its determinations, than in the presence of such a
power.
There is another false conception which has given great apparent force to
the cause of necessity. It is supposed that the states of the will, the
volitions, are often necessitated by the necessitated states of the
sensibility. In other words, it is supposed that the appetites, passions,
and desires, often act upon the will, a
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