theists; though he frequently
speaks of a chain of causes which embrace human volitions.(121) While
Edwards, who opposed the Arminians, generally employs the more rigid term
_cause_; though he, too, frequently represents motive as "the ground and
reason" of volition. The one softens his language, in places, as he
contends with those who had rendered themselves obnoxious to the Christian
world by an advocacy of the doctrine of necessity in connexion with
atheistical sentiments. The other appears to prefer the stronger
expression, as he puts forth his power against antagonists whose views of
liberty were deemed subversive of the tenets of Calvinism. But the law of
causality, as stated by Edwards, and the principle of the sufficient
reason, as defined and employed by Leibnitz, are perfectly identical.
When we are told that motive is the cause of volition, it is evident we
cannot determine whether to deny or to assent to the proposition, unless
we know in what sense the term _cause_ is used. We might discuss this
perplexed question forever, by the use of such vague and indefinite
propositions, without progressing a single step toward the end of the
controversy. We must bring a more searching analysis to the subject, if we
hope to accomplish anything. We must take the word cause or _reason_, in
each of its significations, in order to discover in what particulars the
contending parties agree, and in what particulars they disagree, in order
to see how far each party is right, and how far it is wrong. This is the
only course that promises the least prospect of a satisfactory result.
If we mean by the cause of volition, that which wills or exerts the
volition, there is no controversy; for in this sense the advocates of
necessity admit that the mind is the cause of volition. Thus says Edwards:
"The acts of my will are my own; i. e., they are acts of my will."(122) It
is universally conceded that it is the mind which wills, and nothing else
in the place of it; and hence, in this sense of the word, there is no
question but that the mind is the cause of volition. But the advocates of
necessity cannot be understood in this sense; for they deny that the mind
is the cause of volition, and insist that it is caused by motive.
The term _cause_ is very often used to designate the condition of a thing,
or that without which it could not happen or come to pass. Thus we are
told by Edwards, that he sometimes uses "the word cause to signify
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