any
_antecedent_" of an event, "whether it has any influence or not," in the
production of such event.(123) If this be the meaning, when it is said
that motive is the cause of volition, the truth of the proposition is
conceded by the advocates of free-agency. In speaking of arguments and
motives, Dr. Samuel Clarke says: "Occasions indeed there may be, and are,
upon which that substance in man, wherever the self-moving principle
resides, freely exerts its active power."(124) Herein, then, there is a
perfect agreement between the contending parties. The fact that the mind
requires certain conditions or occasions, on which to exercise its active
power, does not at all interfere with its freedom; and hence the advocates
of free-agency have readily admitted that motives are the occasional
causes of volition. We must look out for some other meaning of the term,
then, if we would clearly and distinctly fix our minds on the point in
controversy.

We say that an antecedent is the cause of its consequent, when the latter
is produced by the action of the former. For example, a motion of the body
is said to be caused by the mind; because it is produced by an act of the
mind. This seems to be what is meant by an "_efficient cause_." It is, no
doubt, the most proper sense of the word; and around this it is that the
controversy still rages, and has for centuries raged.

The advocates of necessity contend, not only that volition is the effect
of motive, but also that "to be an effect implies _passiveness_, or the
being subject to the power and action of its cause."(125) Such precisely
is the doctrine of Edwards, and Collins, and Hobbes. In this sense of the
word it is denied that motive is the cause of volition, and it is affirmed
that mind is the cause thereof. Thus, says Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his reply
to Collins, "'Tis the self-moving principle, and not at all the reason or
motive, which is the _physical_ or _efficient_ cause of action;" by which
we understand him to mean volition, as that is the thing in dispute. Now,
when the advocates of free-agency insist that motive is not the efficient
cause of volition, and that mind is the efficient cause thereof, we
suppose them to employ the expression, _efficient cause_, in one and the
same sense in both branches of the proposition. This is the only fair way
of viewing their language; and if they wished to be understood in any
other manner, they should have taken the pains to explain the