mselves, and
not permit us to be misled by an ambiguity. Here the precise point in
dispute is clearly presented; and let us hear the contending parties,
before we proceed to decide between them.

You are in error, says the necessitarian to his opponents, in denying that
motive, and in affirming that mind, is the efficient cause of volition.
For if an act of the mind, or a volition, is caused by the mind, it must
be produced by a preceding act of the mind, and this act must be produced
by another preceding act of the mind, and so on _ad infinitum_; which
reduces the matter to a plain impossibility. Now, if the necessitarian has
not been deceived by an unwarrantable ambiguity on the part of his
adversary, he has clearly reduced his doctrine to the absurdity of an
infinite series of acts: that is to say, if the advocate of free-agency
does not depart from the ordinary meaning of words, when he affirms that
mind is the _efficient cause_ of volition; and if he does not use these
terms "_efficient cause_," in different senses in the same sentence, then
we feel bound to say that he is fairly caught in the toils of his
adversary. But we are not yet in condition to pass a final judgment
between the parties.

The necessitarian contends that "volition, or an act of the mind, is the
effect of motive, and that it is subject to the power and action of its
cause."(126) The advocate of free-will replies, If we must suppose an
action of motive on the mind to account for its act, we must likewise
suppose another action to account for the action of motive; and so on _ad
infinitum_. Thus the necessitarian seems to be fairly caught in his own
toils, and entrapped by his own definition and arguments.

Our decision (for the correctness of which we appeal to the calm and
impartial judgment of the reader) is as follows: If the term _cause_ be
understood in the first or the second sense above mentioned, there is no
disagreement between the contending parties; and if it be understood in
the third sense, then both parties are in error. If, in order to account
for an act of the mind, we suppose it is caused by an action of motive, we
are involved in the absurdity of an infinite series of actions; and on the
other hand, if we suppose it is caused by a preceding act of the mind
itself, we are forced into the same absurdity. Hence, we conclude, that an
act of the mind, or a volition, is not produced by the action of either
mind or motive, but takes