ect; and this, for aught I
know, may make some imagine that volition has no cause, or that it
produces itself." But this is not a satisfactory account of the
_imagination_, as he would term it. We also find ourselves possessed of
our judgments and feelings before we perceive the effectual power of the
cause which produces them. Why then do we refer these to the operation of
a necessary cause, and not our volitions? If the power and efficacy of the
cause is seen only by the effect in the one case, it is only seen in the
same manner in the other. Why then do we differ in our conclusions with
respect to them? Why do we refer the judgment and the feeling to necessary
causes, and fail to do the same in relation to the volition? The reason is
obvious. The mind is passive in judging and feeling, and hence these
phenomena necessarily demand the operation of causes to account for them;
but the mind is active in its volitions, and this necessarily excludes the
idea of causes to produce them. The mind clearly perceives, by due
reflection, and at all times sees dimly, at least, that an act or volition
is different in its nature from a passive impression or a produced effect;
and hence it knows and feels that it is exempt from the power and efficacy
of a producing cause in its volitions. This fact of our consciousness it
is not in the power of sophistry wholly to conceal, nor in the power of
human nature to evade. Hence we carry about with us the irresistible
conviction that we are free; that our wills are not absolutely subject to
the dominion of causes over which we have no control. Hence we see and
know that we are self-active.

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Having completed our analysis, in as far as our present purpose demands,
we may proceed to show that the system of necessity is founded on a false
psychology,--on a dark confusion of the facts of human nature. It is very
remarkable that all the advocates of this system, from Hobbes down to
Edwards, will allow the human mind to possess only two faculties, the
understanding and the will. The will and the sensibility are expressly
identified by them. Locke distinguished between will and desire, between
the _faculty_ of willing and the _susceptibility_ to feeling; but Edwards
has endeavoured to show that there is no such distinction as that for
which Locke contends. We shall not arrest the progress of our remarks in
order to point out the manner in whic